Crystal Ball Vil Mirzayanov, PhD. Former chief of the Department of Technical Counterintelligence of GosNIIOKhT, gives his opinion on Syria’s Russian Chemical Threat More bad news emerged from Syria in July, when its Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that the Syrian Army may use its chemical weapons (CW) against foreign intervention. He also stated that these weapons wouldn’t be used against Syrians, but are we really to believe this? As a CW scientist, who worked for 26 years in the State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) – the main developer of CW in Russia – I know that these weapons of mass destruction, first and foremost, usually harm and kill ordinary people who are neither protected nor trained. Military people are supposed to be well-trained, protected and supplied with antidotes and medical personnel. The dilemma is how to protect ordinary, Syrian civilians. In this particular case, we are not dealing with untrained terrorists, who don’t have delivery systems for launching CW, but with organised and protected, military personnel whose delivery systems were developed and produced in Russia. It’s important to remember that during Soviet times the chemical officers of the Syrian Army were trained at the Military Chemical Academy in Moscow and in other military chemical colleges within the Soviet Union. As far as I know, the Soviets delivered CW, as well as the artillery systems for launching them, to Syria at end of 1980s. These particular CW are probably already obsolete and expired, but their delivery systems should be still capable of launching chemical attacks. It is very disturbing that even during Boris Yeltsin’s time in office, Russia was co-operating with Syria in the field of CW. Many people have probably already forgotten a scandal in 1994 connected to the Lieutenant General Anatoly Kuntsevich, assistant on CW issues to the President of Russia, who sent to Syria up to 700kg of dichloroanhydride of methylphosphonic acid (DCAMPA), a precursor for the synthesis of nerve agents such as Sarin and VX gas. Exactly at this time, with the help of the Russian military chemical complex, the so-called Syrian Center of Environmental Protection Problems was created in Syria. A lot of equipment, including laboratory hoods capable of working with chemical warfare agents (CA) and vacuum pumps, were sent from GosNIIOKhT via the Air Force base in Chkalovskaya, in the suburbs of Moscow. Canisters with DCAMPA were among the equipment sent to Syria. It was somewhat surprising that only 700kg of DCAMPA were sent to Syria. Then many people understood why. First, the money for this quantity of precursor was supposed to be paid directly into General Kuntsevitch’s pocket. Secondly, it was a purer product than an industrial precursor and it was designed to be used in this Syrian Center in the development and design of a new generation of CW, binary Sarin. Binary chemical weapons are those which are synthesised in-flight to the target in a rocket or shell using two more stable and relatively unharmful chemical substances, which react with each other and produce the final, deadly chemical agent (CA). The main advantage of this type of CW is its capability to be stored for a relatively long time without major precautions or safety problems. To be more exact, the binary version of Sarin was already developed and tested in GosNIIOKhT, and it was much more effective than the US version, because Russians used a more poisonous component for their binary Sarin. The principle of chemical reaction used in this case was given in my book: Vil. S. Mirzayanov. State Secrets: An Insider’s Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program, p. 166. Russia was co-operating with the Syrian Center of Environmental Protection Problems at least until 2002, possibly as a cover up for broader actions. General CBRNe Convergence 2012, 30 Oct – 2 Nov, Norfolk Waterside Marriott, VA, USA. More information on www.icbrnevents.com 78 CBRNe WORLD August 2012 www.cbrneworld.com

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Kuntsevich died that year in Syria, but I’m not sure that the co-operation between Russia and Syria in this area ended with his death. If Syria still has Sarin gas in its storage, as well as the factory for its production, there is only one possibility: the Russians built it and shared their technology after they stopped producing this agent in Volgograd “Khimprom” at the end of the 1970s. The contradictory explanation from the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned above (on July 24th, 2012) about the necessity of mixing seems absurd if related to binary weapons. Binary weapons are not designed for mixing their components on the ground.
There is another possibility, which is connected to specifics of the Russian type of CW. They were developed in such a way that containers with CA were stockpiled in remote storage areas, while shells, mines, bombs and rockets were in other separate storage, sufficiently far away. Before the planned CW attacks, all containers should be transferred to special sites where CW specialists charge the latter with the former. According to recent messages from Syria, their CW were sent somewhere to an unspecified location. I suppose they were sent exactly to the charging stations. After that they’ll be able to move them to the shooting or so-called battle positions.
All this logically brings us to a conclusion: that Russia may still be secretly and materialistically supporting the CW potential of Syria. I would not be surprised at all if, at some time in the future, Russian weapons are found in the CW arsenal of Syria. All of this raises some very serious questions about direct violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), though from the very beginning I expressed my doubts about the true commitment of Russia to this international agreement. Not surprisingly, a list of chemical agents to be controlled by CWC doesn’t include an extremely dangerous new class of nerve CA developed, tested and produced in Russia. Not surprisingly, Russia is now backing a bloody Syrian regime. I can assume that Russia is afraid that, with the fall of Assad’s regime, there is real potential for the discovery of evidence pertaining to its direct violations of the CWC.
CBRNe Convergence 2012, 30 Oct – 2 Nov, Norfolk Waterside Marriott, VA, USA. More information on www.icbrnevents.com

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NYT Holiday Books Edition Features Author Vil S. Mirzayanov’s ‘State Secrets’

Dec 04 2013 07:30 AM | IndieBot in Indie & Self Publishing News

or five Outskirts Press authors, this is proving to be a very exciting time of year — when their books appear in the annual  the New York Times Holiday Books Edition. Published each December, this edition of the NYT Book Review is a special edition co-op ad that places your book ad front and center. This special holiday ad represents a unique — and rare — opportunity to gain priceless visibility, just in time for the holiday book-buying boom.

The New York Times Holiday Books Edition is distributed to nearly 5 million people, and in the pages of that edition is the Outskirts Press co-op announcement (featured at the end of this blog post). Today we shine the holiday spotlight on author Vil S. Mirzayanov’s non-fiction, State Secrets: An Insider’s Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program.

Long before there was the Syrian chemical weapons crisis of 2013, there was perestroika: In the 1980s, while Mikhail Gorbachev and others staunchly denied the existence of chemical weapons in Russia, the State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology in Moscow was developing that very thing. It was scientist Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, chief of the Counterintelligence Department, who was responsible for developing methods of detecting extremely minute in the environment surrounding the institute.

State Secrets takes a startling insider’s look at the Russian chemical weapons program, and draws a direct connection between it and Syria. Mirzayanov was in a unique position to gather intelligence about these weapons, including their precise chemical makeup, and was the first whistleblower to reveal the Russian chemical weapons program to the world.

Mirzayanov’s book provides a shocking, up-close examination of Russia’s military and political complex and its extraordinary efforts to hide dangerous weapons from the world. State Secretsshould serve as a chilling cautionary tale for peoples and governments the world over, and serve as a guide on which defense and chemical weapon antidotes can be based.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Born in 1935 in a rural village in rural Bashkortstan, Russia, Vil Mirzayanov was the son of the village school teacher. He distinguished himself as a chemist, and over a 26 year period worked at the State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology in Moscow, which was the main developer of chemical weapons in Russia. At some point during the 1980s, Dr. Mirzayanov came to the conclusion that chemical weapons were unnecessary for his country’s defense, and dangerous for people near the manufacturing and storage sites. During perestroika, the chemical weapons program was going ahead at full speed, while President Gorbachev and others denied its existence. Dr. Mirzayanov tried to change things through the usual channels at his institute, but was rebuffed.

In 1991, he published a short article in “Kuranty,” hinting at the chemical weapons program. No one paid attention — except his employer and the KGB. He was fired from his job. In the fall of 1992 Dr. Mirzayanov gave an interview with “The Baltimore Sun” and co-authored an article in Moscow News. In October, he was arrested and sent to Lefortovo Prison charged with revealing state secrets. He never gave any formulas or protocols for synthesis of the super deadly new class of chemical agents he referred to, called “Novichok” or newcomer at that time. Though he was released 11 days later, he remained under house arrest until his trial in January 1994.

The closed-door show trial attracted a great deal of international attention and the support of many scientists and human rights advocates all over the world. Dr. Mirzayanov became the first person in 70 years to sue the Russian government, including the Procurator General’s office, the KGB and his institute. He won a 30 million ruble award, later overturned by an appeals court.

In 1995, Dr. Mirzayanov immigrated to the United States and wrote this book about his life and experiences within the Soviet/Russian chemical military complex. He has received the 1993 Cavallo Foundation Special Award for Moral Courage, the 1994 Heinz R. Pagels Human Rights of Scientists Award of the New York Academy of Sciences and the 1995 American Association for the Advancement of Science (A.A.A.S.) Scientific Freedom and Responsibility Award.

Novichok’

Editorial of The New York Sun | September 9, 2013

It strains the English language to try to encapsulate just how cynical is the idea that Syria could squirm out of a military strike by giving up control of its arsenal of chemical weapons in a deal that includes — wait for it — Russia. The idea that Mr. al-Assad could dodge a war by giving up control of Syria’s weapons was floated by Secretary of State Kerry in what the New York Times called a “seemingly off-hand suggestion.” The Kremlin promptly jumped at the idea, and the White House, according to the Times, is now studying it.

To grasp just how cynical this is, try Googling the word “novichok.” The first entry turned up in our Google search was from Wikipedia, which reports that the word means “newcomer” and refers to a series of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. They were, according to Wikipedia, “allegedly the most deadly nerve agents ever made.” We first started thinking about them in February 1996, when the Jewish Forward newspaper, which is based in New York and covers Russia, among other beats, ran a dispatch headlined “Russia Is Evading Agreement on Poison Gas, General Warns.”
The dispatch, by James Ring Adams and Edward Schilling, reported on an interview Mr. Schilling conducted at Moscow with General Anatoly Kuntsevich, who had once been in charge of the Kremlin’s chemical weapons program. It was he who had reportedly set up the program to share chemical weapons with Syria. In 1996, in a desperate bid to avoid prosecution in post-Soviet Russia, Kuntsevich went public with a warning that a faction of the army and government was seeking to abandon treaty agreements to destroy the Russian chemical weapons program.
It was a chilling interview that was followed up by the Wall Street Journal’s editorial page, a major proponent of vigilance on proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. It ran a piece by Mr. Adams, warning that the “toxic threat” from Russia was not raising adequate alarm. The existence of a new generation of nerve gas weapons in and of itself had already been disclosed by several scientists in the Soviet Union’s chemical program. Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, Vladimir Uglev, and Andre Zheleznyakov went public in 1992, “in defiance of the government,” as the Forward put it.
Dr. Mirzayanov was put in the dock for treason in 1994, but the case was abandoned and Dr. Mirzayanov eventually moved to America, where as late as Desert Storm he told the Forward that the new Soviet gas was undetectable by Western defenses. Unlike other chemical weapons precursors, the Forward quoted him as saying, the components of the new agents could be disguised as products for peaceful use. The point was of concern to America and Israel. A year ago a German news magazine, Der Spiegel, reported that as late as the 1990s “the Russians were still stationing intelligence officers in the Golan Heights and in northern Syria.”
“The Israelis,” according to Spiegel, “were seething.” It reported that Kuntsevich’s life did not end until April 3, 2002, when, as Spiegel put it, the general, a “winner of the Lenin Prize” and “most recently” an employee at the Moscow-based Zelinsky Institute of Organic Chemistry, “died on a flight from Damascus to Moscow.” Reported Spiegel: “The circumstances of his death remain mysterious, along with the inscription on his headstone at the Troyekurovskoye Cemetery in western Moscow, where his date of death is marked as March 29.”
The Sun can’t vouch for the veracity of these reports, but neither have we any reason to doubt them. There is a long, sordid tale to be unraveled here. What the reports do underscore is that any settlement of the Syrian chemical weapons threat that involves a supposedly benign role by Russia would be a dodge of extraordinary cynicism, even for Secretary of State Kerry. Our instinct is that neither Syria nor Russia is going to permit these weapons to go under the control of America or Israel or another free, democratic, pro-western country. Let Congress be wary of any claims to the contrary.